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GOVERNMENT LIABILITY FOR REGULATORY
FAILURE IN THE FUKUSHIMA DISASTER:
A COMMON LAW COMPARISON
Joel Rheuben†
Abstract: This article considers the Japanese government’s response to the 2011
Fukushima nuclear power disaster, in assisting Tokyo Electric Power Company
(“TEPCO”) with handling claims for compensation. It argues that in setting guidelines
for claims, establishing a government alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) body to deal
with disputes, and creating a convoluted funding structure that has led to the effective
nationalization of TEPCO, the government has intervened significantly in what are
essentially private disputes governed by the Nuclear Compensation Law. This is
contrasted with the less interventionist response of the New South Wales government in
Australia to mass tort claims for asbestos exposure. This article argues that this
difference in approach can be attributed to the respective scope of state liability for
regulatory failure in Japan and common law countries. Whereas courts in common law
countries have imposed a high threshold for establishing the liability of public authorities,
Japanese courts have acknowledged liability more readily, creating an incentive for the
Japanese government to divert potential claims against itself from the courts.

I.

Introduction

In March 2011 the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant in northeastern Japan attained the nearly unique distinction of experiencing a nuclear
disaster measuring level seven on the International Atomic Energy Agency’s
International Nuclear Event Scale. The events of the disaster are now so
well-known that they require only a cursory summary here.1 In short, the
earthquake that devastated much of Japan’s north-east (Tōhoku) region on
11 March also succeeded in damaging electricity transmission between the
Fukushima Dai-ichi plant and nearby transformers. 2 Emergency diesel
generators were automatically activated onsite, but these too were destroyed
when the tsunami that followed less than an hour after the earthquake
breached the breakwaters surrounding the coastal plant, cutting off all
†
Joel Rheuben is a Solicitor (New South Wales) and an LLM candidate at the University of Tokyo.
The author is very grateful and would like to thank to Professors Dan Foote, Rob Leflar, Luke Nottage,
Katsuya Uga and Greg Weeks for comments on an earlier draft of this article. Any residual errors are the
author’s own. This article is an expanded and reworked version of the author’s chapter in SIMON BUTT, et
al., Asia-Pacific Disaster Management: Comparative and Socio-Legal Perspectives (Springer 2013
forthcoming), originally presented at the Disaster Management and Japanese Law workshop held at
Tohoku University on 9 February 2013.
1
See generally FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR ACCIDENT INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION COMMISSION,
OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR ACCIDENT INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION COMMISSION
(2012) for a full overview.
2
Id. at 12.
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electricity to the cooling systems for the plant’s six reactors and precipitating
a meltdown in three of them.3 As the crisis worsened and radiation leaked
from the plant, more than 150,000 people were forcibly evacuated from the
surrounding area, and many more left voluntarily.4
In the months following the disaster, four separate committees were
established to investigate and report on the causes of the disaster.5 Several
of these committees’ reports, and in particular the report of the National
Diet’s Independent Investigation Commission, attribute the disaster to a
systemic lack of safety precautions common throughout the nuclear power
industry in Japan, and to a series of costly judgment errors. 6 The
Independent Investigation Commission’s report does not limit its criticism to
the Fukushima plant’s operator, Tokyo Electric Power Company
(“TEPCO”); instead, it also sternly rebukes regulators for falling “captive”
to the industry—relying on the industry for nuclear know-how and failing to
put in place or enforce adequate safety standards. 7 The report of the
“Independent Investigation Commission on the Fukushima Nuclear
Accident,” a private body, is equally scathing of a bureaucratic culture
within the main regulatory bodies that prevented the development of
independent technological expertise and was resistant to change. 8 The
reports of both independent investigation commissions categorize the
Fukushima disaster as a classic case of regulatory failure.9
Under the Nuclear Compensation Law, 10 the main legislation
governing civil claims for nuclear accidents, TEPCO alone bears direct
liability for compensating the tens of thousands of evacuees and businesses
3

Id.
Id. at 19.
5
See id. TOKYO ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY, FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR ACCIDENT ANALYSIS REPORT
14-15 (2011); INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE ON THE ACCIDENT AT FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR POWER STATIONS
OF TOKYO ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY, FINAL REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE ON THE
ACCIDENT AT FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR POWER STATIONS OF TOKYO ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY 1 (2012);
INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION COMMISSION ON THE FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR ACCIDENT, FUKUSHIMA
GENPATSU JIKO DOKURITSU KENSHŌ IINKAI CHŌSA/KENSHŌ HOKOKUSHO [INVESTIGATION/VERIFICATION
REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION COMMISSION ON THE FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR ACCIDENT]
(2012).
6
FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR ACCIDENT INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 10.
7
INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION COMMISSION ON THE FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR ACCIDENT, supra note
5, at 16.
8
Id. at 288-90.
9
See generally FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR ACCIDENT INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION COMMISSION, supra
note 1, at 42-45; INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION COMMISSION ON THE FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR ACCIDENT,
supra note 5, at ch. 7.
10
Genshiryoku songai no baishō ni kansuru hōritusu [The Act on Compensation for Nuclear
Damage], Law No. 147 of 1961 (Japan), available at http://www.oecd-nea.org/law/legislation/japandocs/Japan-Nuclear-Damage-Compensation-Act.pdf.
4
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who continue to be affected by radiation.11 Since this liability is estimated
to be significantly more than the value of TEPCO’s assets, the Japanese
government has provided TEPCO with financial assistance to prevent
insolvency. 12 As explained in Part II.B. below, the government has also
established a mediation center, the Dispute Resolution Center for Nuclear
Damage Compensation, under the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports,
Science and Technology (“MEXT”) to handle compensation disputes
between TEPCO and its victims.13 If the government was content to give
TEPCO free rein to conduct its business before the accident, it seems that it
has taken a far stronger interest in intervening in the aftermath.
This article argues that the mechanisms established for resolving and
funding payouts in disputes between claimants and TEPCO in the aftermath
of Fukushima should be viewed against the backdrop of the government’s
own potential liability for the disaster. 14 No doubt there are compelling
political and economic reasons for the government to have intervened and to
have prevented TEPCO’s insolvency.15 However, from the perspective of
the government’s own legal liability, the manner in which it has intervened
can be explained by the ever-present risk that claimants, dissatisfied with the
amount of TEPCO’s compensation or the speed of its response, could move
their complaints to the courts and sue the government for its failure to
prevent the nuclear disaster.
As noted below, there is ample precedent for Japanese courts finding
national and local governments liable for regulatory failure.16 This situation
is not unique to Japan: courts in Germany, from which Japan draws much of
its public law jurisprudence, have also consistently found against

11

Id. at art. 3 (albeit subject to certain exemptions. See infra, Part II.B).
See generally Kōji Aribayashi, Genshiryoku songai baishō shien kikō hō no seitei to gaiyō [The
Establishment of and an Overview of the Nuclear Damages Liability Facilitation Fund Law], 1433
JURISUTO (2011) (on file with author).
13
See generally Daniel H. Foote, Japan’s ADR System for Resolving Nuclear Power-Related
Damage Disputes (2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
14
See Eric A. Feldman, Fukushima: Catastrophe, Compensation, and Justice in Japan, 62 DEPAUL
L. REV. 335, 341 (2013) (arguing that there is a weak tradition of direct government compensation in
natural and other major disasters in Japan. He points to the fact that there has been no move to provide
comprehensive compensation for Tōhoku residents outside of the nuclear-affected area who lost their
homes due to the earthquake or tsunami).
15
See generally Hatsuru Morita, Rescuing Victims and Rescuing TEPCO: A Legal and Political
Analysis of the TEPCO Bailout (2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers
.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2026868.
16
The author uses the term “regulatory failure” here to refer to the failure to exercise a range of
discretionary functions, and not simply functions related to passing regulations (rule-making functions).
12
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government for failure to exercise regulatory functions.17 However, it does
stand in stark contrast with the situation in common law countries, where
courts have historically set a high threshold for finding public authorities
liable in tort for the exercise of regulatory functions in general, and for
regulatory failure in particular.18
This article compares Japan’s approach to liability for regulatory
failure with that of courts in common law countries, and Australia in
particular. To illustrate the implications of potential liability on structuring
government responses to disasters, I use the example of mass tort litigation
for asbestos-related diseases in New South Wales (“NSW”), Australia’s
most populous state.
No common law country has suffered a nuclear accident comparable
to the Fukushima disaster.19 Indeed, Australia does not even have a nuclear
power industry. The Fukushima disaster occurred amidst one of the most
catastrophic events in Japanese history—namely, the Tōhoku earthquake and
tsunami—and had the potential to be even more catastrophic still. Naturally,
then, it is difficult to predict how any government or court faced with the
same circumstances would respond, and so any comparisons necessarily
must be tenuous.
Nevertheless, there are strong parallels between radiation from
nuclear power generation and environmental exposure to asbestos. Both
involve man-made risks, and, unlike natural disasters, are potentially subject
to regulation to minimize harm. Both involve potentially fatal hazards to
health, further raising the expectation that any regulatory response will be
robust. However, in the specific examples of the Fukushima disaster and the
regulation of asbestos in Australia, these expectations have been arguably
unmet. The willingness of courts to intrude upon administrative discretion
by considering the reasonableness of the regulatory response is therefore
instructive. Indeed, it is in the context of asbestos litigation that the
Australian principles of government liability for regulatory failure have been
most clearly articulated.
17
See Ralph-Andreas Surma, A Comparative Study of the English and German Judicial Approach to
the Liability of Public Bodies in Negligence, in TORT LIABILITY OF PUBLIC AUTHORITIES IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE 355, 364-78 (Duncan Fairgrieve, et al. eds., 2002).
18
See generally Mark Aronson, Government Liability in Negligence, 32 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 42
(2008); Greg Weeks, Private Law Litigation Against the Government: Are Public Authorities and Private
Actors Really 'the Same?' (2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=1604324.
19
In comparison, the 1979 Three Mile Island accident in the United States was contained before a
full reactor meltdown occurred, and although generating a small amount of litigation, did not lead to an
indefinite evacuation of large numbers of residents requiring compensation.
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The example of asbestos litigation in NSW demonstrates the potential
responses available to governments in common law countries in similar
circumstances. Both nuclear power facilities and building products
containing asbestos are to some degree integrated into daily life in
residential areas (unlike, for example, oil spills), raising the potential for
large numbers of indeterminate claims by poorly-resourced claimants—
whether against the primary tortfeasor or the government. Indeed, as noted
below, the rates of asbestos-related diseases in Australia (and NSW in
particular) are the highest in the world, and the number of associated claims
are proportionally comparable to those arising from the Fukushima disaster.
Both have given rise to a need to deal with disputes quickly and to avoid
overburdening the ordinary courts. Uniquely among common law countries,
the NSW government’s response to mass tort litigation for asbestos exposure
was the creation of a special tribunal (the Dust Diseases Tribunal), 20
allowing comparison with the Dispute Resolution Center for Nuclear
Damage Compensation.
Asbestos claims in NSW have also largely been brought against a
single defendant, the James Hardie group, whose Australian-based assets
have proven insufficient to meet its ongoing liabilities.21 The example of
mass asbestos litigation in Australia therefore further offers a useful
comparison of how governments have faced the problem of ensuring that the
primary defendant remained adequately capitalized and sufficiently
responsive to claimants.
This article argues that whereas the Japanese approach to the
Fukushima disaster has been interventionist, ultimately leading to the
effective nationalization of TEPCO, the NSW government in its response to
mass tort claims has taken a far less dirigiste approach. This is not to
suggest that governments in common law countries never take a more
interventionist approach to resolving mass disputes—indeed, depending on
political and economic factors they may well do. However, free from
concern over their own potential liability, the NSW experience suggests that
they do not need to.

20
See John L. O’Meally, Asbestos Litigation in New South Wales, 15 J. L. & POL’Y 1209-1213
(2007) (noting that the only other body of this type in the common law world is in Tasmania, another
Australian state).
21
See generally Edwina Dunn, James Hardie: No Soul to be Damned and No Body to be Kicked, 27
SYDNEY L. REV. 339 (2005).
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THE FUKUSHIMA DISASTER COMPENSATION FRAMEWORK

This Part explains Japan’s nuclear disaster compensation scheme.
Specifically, this Part posits that A) TEPCO is the sole defendant under
Japan’s Nuclear Compensation Law, B) the Japanese government guides the
TEPCO compensation scheme, and C) financial assistance from the
government has effectively nationalized TEPCO.
A.

TEPCO is the Sole Defendant Under the Nuclear Compensation Law

Compensation for losses arising from nuclear accidents, and hence
TEPCO’s own liability, is principally governed by the Nuclear
Compensation Law, the provisions of which take precedence over the
general tort provisions of the Civil Code. The law is aimed at ensuring
sufficient access to compensation by victims in the event of a nuclear
accident by way of clear principles of liability and the imposition of a
mandatory insurance scheme.22 It generally accords with the principles of
the 1960 Paris Convention on Nuclear Third Party Liability, insofar as
liability under the law is strict and centered exclusively on nuclear power
operators.23 Operators are exempted from liability only where damages have
occurred as a result of a major natural disaster of an exceptional character or
social unrest.24 Where damages are attributable to a third party, operators
still retain primary liability, but can cross-claim against the third party for
recovery.25 However, whereas the Paris Convention sets an upper limit on
the liability of operators,26 under the Nuclear Compensation Law liability is
unlimited.27
The law applies to all claims in respect of “nuclear damage,” defined
as “damages caused by the effects of fission of nuclear fuel material, the
effects of radiation from nuclear fuel material, or the toxic effects of such
material.”28 On its face, this definition would appear to restrict liability to
22
Genshiryoku songai no baishō ni kansuru hōritusu [The Act on Compensation for Nuclear
Damage], Law No. 147 of 1961, art. 1 (Japan).
23
Id. at art. 3. For the Convention’s text, see http://www.oecd-nea.org/law/nlparis_conv.html (last
visited August 29, 2013).
24
Genshiryoku songai no baishō ni kansuru hōritusu [The Act on Compensation for Nuclear
Damage], Law No. 147 of 1961, art. 1 (Japan).
25
Id. at art. 5.
26
Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, art. VII, July 29, 1960,
available at http://www.oecd-nea.org/law/nlparis_conv.html.
27
See Genshiryoku songai no baishō ni kansuru hōritusu [The Act on Compensation for Nuclear
Damage], Law No. 147 of 1961, art. 1 (Japan). The statute provides the basis for operator liability, but
makes no reference to limitation of liability.
28
Id. at art. 1(2).
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physical damage resulting directly from radiation. However, in the small
handful of reported cases under the Nuclear Compensation Law following
Japan’s previous worst nuclear accident—the radiation leak from a fuel
conversion plant in Tōkaimura, Ibaraki Prefecture in 199929—courts applied
a broader, causation-based test. 30 A causal relationship was found, for
example, between the accident and subsequent reputational damage to
vegetable growers in the area.31 The scope of damages for which TEPCO
alone could potentially be found liable on a strict and unlimited basis is
therefore quite wide.
In order to meet the anticipated high costs of a major nuclear accident,
the Nuclear Compensation Law obliges operators to purchase insurance up
to a minimum indemnification amount of JPY 120 billion per plant, or else
to make a deposit of the full amount with the government.32 Beyond this,
operators bear the costs of compensation alone, although the law requires the
government to “assist” operators where the government “deems it
necessary.”33 The nature of this assistance is not specified and theoretically
ranges from free money to low-interest finance, to the acquisition of an
equity interest in the operator (which, indirectly, is what has occurred in the
case of TEPCO).34
Aside from this vague requirement of assistance, and consistent with
the principle of operator-only liability, there is no explicit provision under
the Nuclear Compensation Law that assigns liability to the government, nor
any right to recourse against the government by either operators or victims.
Where operators are excluded from liability as a result of an exceptional
natural disaster or social unrest, the government is required to “take
29

See Int’l Atomic Energy Agency (“IAEA”), Report on the Preliminary Fact Finding Mission
Following the Accident at the Nuclear Fuel Processing Facility in Takaimura, Japan (1999), available at
http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/TOAC_web.pdf.
30
See Mitō Chihō Saibansho [Mito Dist. Ct.] June 24, 2003, Hei 12 (wa) no. 487; Tōkyō Chihō
Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] Sep. 27, 2004, Hei 14 (wa) 19606 (Japan); Tōkyō Chihō Saibansho [Tokyo
Dist. Ct.] Apr. 19, 2006, Hei 14 (wa) 6644; Mitō Chihō Saibansho [Mito Dist. Ct.] Feb. 27, 2008, Hei 14
(wa) 513; Tōkyō Chihō Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] Feb. 29, 2008, Hei 19 (wa) 7869 (Japan); Tōkyō
Chihō Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] May 23, 2008, Hei 16 (wa) 21303 (Japan).
31
Tōkyō Chihō Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] Feb. 29, 2008, Hei 19 (wa) 7869; Tōkyō Chihō
Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] Apr. 19, 2006, Hei 14 (wa) 6644.
32
Genshiryoku songai no baishō ni kansuru hōritusu [The Act on Compensation for Nuclear
Damage], Law No. 147 of 1961, art. 1 (Japan).
33
Id. at art.16.
34
Feldman, supra note 14, at 344 (arguing that the government could have taken over the
compensation process itself, but chose not to because of its traditional aversion to compensating after
natural disasters). However, based on the current wording of the provision, direct government
compensation arguably would not be possible, since the government is required to do no more than assist
the operator in making payments.
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necessary measures to relieve victims and to prevent further damage,”35 but
this requirement again falls short of an enforceable civil remedy. Early
drafts of the law did in fact impose an obligation on the government to
compensate victims above the operator’s insurance threshold, but this was
removed at the insistence of the finance ministries, precisely because of
concern over open-ended liability.36
B.

The TEPCO Compensation Scheme has been Guided by the
Government

TEPCO is, therefore, the first and only port of call for members of the
public seeking compensation for the Fukushima disaster under the Nuclear
Compensation Law, whether by direct or mediated settlement, or by civil
action. There may be arguments that the scale of the Tohoku earthquake and
subsequent tsunami were so unforeseeable that the exemption to liability
provision applies, absolving TEPCO of liability. However, the bulk of
academic opinion in and outside of Japan weighs against this proposition,37
and TEPCO itself has arguably forfeited any right to rely on this exemption
by voluntarily making compensation payments.38
At the behest of the Ministry for the Economy, Trade and Industry
(“METI”), TEPCO initiated provisional compensation payments of up to
JPY one million per household to claimants in the area immediately
surrounding the Fukushima Dai-ichi plant from late April 2011.39 At the
same time, the government began making provisional payments to affected
small and medium-sized businesses in the region, particularly those in the

35
Genshiryoku songai no baishō ni kansuru hōritusu [The Act on Compensation for Nuclear
Damage], Law No. 147 of 1961, art. 1 (Japan).
36
Takeshi Hitomi, Fukushima dai-ichi genshiryoku hatsudensho jiko no songai baishō
[Compensation for Damages from the Accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant], 56
HŌGAKU SEMINAA, at 21 (2011) (on file with author); Masatada Akimoto, Genshiryoku Songai Baishō:
Higai Kyūsai Hōri no Kokoromi [Nuclear Damages Compensation: An Approach for Legal Principles for
Victim Relief] 63 JIYŪ TO SEIGI [LIBERTY AND JUSTICE], at 25 (2012) (on file with author).
37
See Eri Osaka, Corporate Liability, Government Liability and the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster, 21
PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 443, 444-47 (2012) (arguing that the Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami were well
within the range of predictable natural disasters according to the standards set by the Atomic Energy
Commission).
38
See Yomiuri Shimbun, Tōden ni menseki futekiyō wa ayamari . . . kabunushi ga teiso, kuni wa
hanron [Not Applying the Exemption to TEPCO was an Error . . . Shareholders Bring Suit, the State
Responds], Oct. 20, 2011 (derivative suit brought by a group of TEPCO shareholders against the national
government on this basis) (on file with author).
39
Nikkei Shimbun, Keikaku hinan mo kari-barai Kin Baishō 1-settai 100-man en (Keisanshō to
Tōden chōsei) [Provisional Compensation of JPY 1 million per Household for Designated Evacuees (METI
and TEPCO’s agreement)], Apr. 12, 2011 (on file with author).
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tourism sector suffering reputational damage by association with
“Fukushima.”40
The Nuclear Compensation Law anticipates the establishment within
MEXT of a Dispute Reconciliation Committee for Nuclear Damage
Compensation to oversee resolution of disputes between operators and
victims in the event of a nuclear accident.41 A committee was formed for the
first time after the Tōkaimura accident in 1999, 42 and again after the
Fukushima disaster in April 2011. 43 In response to the perceived
inconsistent approaches taken in judicial decisions arising out of the
Tōkaimura accident, the Nuclear Compensation Law was amended to
provide the Dispute Reconciliation Committee with the power to issue nonbinding guidelines on the appropriate scope for compensation, in order to
supplement the vague definition of “nuclear damage” under the law. 44
Accordingly, the Fukushima Dispute Reconciliation Committee announced
its Interim Guidelines on the Scope of Nuclear Damages from the Accident
at the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi and Dai-ni Plants on 5 August 2011.45
Following the Dispute Reconciliation Committee’s announcement, TEPCO
put in place a system to make “permanent” compensation payments,
covering the gap between provisional payments and the full amount
claimed.46 As of August 2013, some 673,000 applications for compensation
had been received by TEPCO, of which TEPCO and claimants have reached
an agreed compensation amount in 601,000 cases. 47 Where TEPCO and
claimants cannot reach agreement, or where claimants are otherwise
40
Heisei 23 nen Genshiryoku jiko niyoru higai ni kakaru kinkyūsochi ni kansuru hōritsu [Law
Relating to Emergency Facilities for the 2011 Nuclear Disaster], Law No. 91 of 2011 (Japan).
41
Genshiryoku songai no baishō ni kansuru hōritusu [The Act on Compensation for Nuclear
Damage], Law No. 147 of 1961, art. 18 (Japan).
42
Genshiryoku songai baishō funsō chōsei iinkai no setchi no tame no seirei [Cabinet Order for the
Establishment of the Dispute Reconciliation Committee for Nuclear Damage Compensation], Cabinet
Order No. 332 of 1999 (Japan).
43
Genshiryoku songai baishō funsō chōsei iinkai no setchi no tame no seirei [Cabinet Order for the
Establishment of the Dispute Reconciliation Committee for Nuclear Damage Compensation,] Cabinet
Order No. 99 of 2011 (Japan).
44
Nobuo Kojima, Fukushima dai-ichi genshiryoku hatsudensho jiko ni kan suru songai baishō to
wore ni kanren suru sho-mondai [Damages Compensation for the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power
Plant Accident and Various Related Problems], 62 JIYŪ TO SEIGI [LIBERTY AND JUSTICE], at 36 (2011) (on
file with author).
45
FUKUSHIMA DISPUTE RECONCILIATION COMMITTEE, INTERIM GUIDELINES ON THE SCOPE OF
NUCLEAR DAMAGES FROM THE ACCIDENT AT THE TEPCO FUKUSHIMA DAI-ICHI AND DAI-NI PLANTS,
http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/shingi/chousa/kaihatu/016/index.htm.
46
Press Release, Tokyo Electric Power Company, Permanent Compensation for Nuclear Damages
by the Accident at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station and Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station
(Aug. 30, 2011), http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/11083007-e.html.
47
See Records of Applications and Payouts for Indemnification of Nuclear Damage,
http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/comp/images/jisseki-e.pdf (excluding almost 1.3 million applications from
voluntary evacuees, which are treated separately by TEPCO).
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reluctant to approach TEPCO directly, they may refer the dispute to the
Dispute Resolution Center for Nuclear Damage Compensation, a newly
established alternative dispute resolution body. 48 In the alternative,
claimants may pursue tort litigation on the basis of the Nuclear
Compensation Law.49
The Dispute Reconciliation Committee’s powers formally include the
mediation of compensation-related disputes. 50 The Dispute Resolution
Center was set up in August 2011 to assist in mediation between TEPCO
and dissatisfied claimants, after it became clear that a larger and more
sophisticated body would be required to handle the potentially large volume
of disputes.51 Mediators, as well as investigators, who act as rapporteurs by
gathering facts and refining issues of contention, are all lawyers seconded
from the Japan Federation of Bar Associations, while the remainder of the
Center’s staff is made up of secondees from the Ministry of Justice and
MEXT. 52 Nevertheless, the requirement that mediators use the Interim
Guidelines as a base for their settlement proposals,53 together with the fact
that the Center sits under and is funded by MEXT (notwithstanding initial
proposals—and the insistence of the Japanese legal profession—that the
Center should be established outside of government), has led to criticisms
that the Center is not sufficiently independent.54
48

DISPUTE RESOLUTION CENTER FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE COMPENSATION, GUIDE TO THE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION
CENTER
FOR
NUCLEAR
DAMAGE
COMPENSATION,
(2011),
http://www.mext.go.jp/component/a_menu/science/detail/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2013/07/10/1329118_001_1.
pdf.
49
Nothing prevents claimants from bringing civil action against TEPCO in tandem with seeking
mediation through the Dispute Resolution Center, or even after a completed settlement. Indeed, it may be
entirely rational to do so preemptively, given that the limitation period for actions in tort is 3 years and so
will expire in March 2014. See MINPŌ [MINPŌ] [CIV. C.], art. 724 (Japan).
50
Genshiryoku songai no baishō ni kansuru hōritusu [The Act on Compensation for Nuclear
Damage], Law No. 147 of 1961, art. 18(2)(i) (Japan).
51
Naoki Idei, Genpatsu jiko songai baishō seikyū to ADR no katsuyō: genshiryoku songai baishō
funsō kaiketsu sentaa no katsudō wo chūshin to shite [The Use of ADR in Nuclear Accident Damages
Compensation Claims: Centred on the Dispute Resolution Centre for Nuclear Damage Compensation], 63
JIYŪ TO SEIGI [LIBERTY AND JUSTICE] at 72 (2012) (on file with author).
52
See DISPUTE RESOLUTION CENTER FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE COMPENSATION, GENSHIRYOKU
SONGAI BAISHŌ FUNSŌ SENTAA KATSUDŌ JŌKYŌ HŌKOKUSHO – HEISEI 24-NEN NI OKERU JŌKYŌ NI TSUITE
[REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION CENTER FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE
COMPENSATION—IN
RESPECT
OF
ACTIVITIES
FOR
2012]
(2013),
http://www.mext.go.jp/component/a_menu/science/detail/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2013/03/05/1329118_010.pd
f.
53
Dispute Resolution Center for Nuclear Damage Compensation Mediation Rules, art. 21 (on file
with author); see MINISTRY OF EDUC., CULTURE, SPORTS, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY – JAPAN,
http://www.mext.go.jp/a_menu/genshi_baisho/jiko_baisho/detail/1329129.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2013)
(in fact, mediators have expanded on the Interim Guidelines with a series of detailed standards of their
own).
54
Akimoto, supra note 36, at 25; Idei, supra note 51, at 72. The Center arguably bears some of the
characteristics of the governmental ADR bodies used as examples in Frank Upham’s classic work. See

JANUARY 2014

GOVERNMENT LIABILITY FOR REGULATORY FAILURE

123

One of the challenges faced by the Center has been a degree of
intransigence by TEPCO. A number of disputes have arisen, for example,
because of TEPCO’s unwillingness to compensate for items not specified
under the Dispute Reconciliation Committee’s guidelines, notwithstanding
the Committee’s intention that the guidelines should serve as a minimum
only.55 The Center has taken a number of measures to discipline TEPCO in
egregious cases, including awarding premiums to claimants in its settlement
proposals, and “naming and shaming” TEPCO on the Center’s website.56
The dispute resolution system under the Center is not without its
drawbacks for claimants. Mediators were slow to resolve claims during the
initial months of the Center’s operations,57 and the Center continues to have
a large backlog of claims. 58 However, timeframes are still considerably
shorter than the average speed of court proceedings.59 Claims through the
Center arguably provide a greater prospect of success than litigation, where
the imbalance with TEPCO is starker for unrepresented litigants in
particular.60 Indeed, in November 2011 TEPCO announced that it would
abide by the Center’s settlement proposals.61 As a free service, it is also
considerably cheaper. It is unclear how many claims have been brought by

generally FRANK K. UPHAM, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN POSTWAR JAPAN (1987). Upham argues that
these bodies were set up to “capture” disputes away from the judiciary, so as to prevent social movements
coalescing around litigation and the courts ruling contrary to the preferences of the Japanese elite. Through
these ADR bodies, Upham argues, the bureaucracy can keep the resolution of disputes particularized,
informal and opaque. UPHAM at 16-27.
55
Foote, supra note 13, at 16.
56
See Tōkyō Denryoku Kabushiki Kaisha no Taiō ni Mondai no aru Kohyō ni tsuite [On Cases in
which TEPCO’s Response has been Problematic], http://www.mext.go.jp/a_menu/genshi_baisho/
jikobaisho/detail/1329350.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2013).
57
Foote, supra note 13, at 11.
58
The Dispute Resolution Center has only disposed of 5065 of 7545 claims received to date. See
Dispute Resolution Ctr. for Nuclear Damage Comp., Wakai Chūkai Tetsudzuki no Jisshi Jōkyō
[Enforcement Status of Settlement Mediation Procedures], http://www.mext.go.jp/a_menu/genshi_baisho
/jiko_baisho/detail/1329118.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2013).
59
On the basis that the Dispute Resolution Center aims to resolve all claims within four to five
months, it averaged around eight months per case in 2012 (DISPUTE RESOLUTION CENTER FOR NUCLEAR
DAMAGE COMPENSATION, supra note 52, at 1), as opposed to an average of 15.1 months for environmental
pollution claims at the district court level. See generally SUPREME COURT OF JAPAN, Saiban no Jinsokuka
ni kakawaru Kenshō Kekka no Kōhyō (Dai 5-kai) ni tsuite [On the Announcement of the 5th Verification
of the Results of the Acceleration of Hearings] (2013), available at http://www.courts.go.jp/about/siryo/
hokoku_05_about /index.html.)
60
Almost three-quarters of claimants do not have legal representation, which has contributed to
delays in processing claims. See Foote, supra note 13, at 11.
61
Naoki Idei, The Nuclear Damage Claim Dispute Resolution Center, 28 Japan Commercial
Arbitration
Ass’n
Newsletter,
1,
1
(2012),
available
at
http://www.jcaa.or.jp/e/arbitration/docs/newsletter28.pdf.
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way of litigation, but the number would appear not to be large.62 In spite of
its limitations, mediation through the Center appears to remain a more
attractive option than litigation.
C.

Government Financial Assistance has Effectively Nationalized
TEPCO

Early on it became apparent that TEPCO would be unable to meet its
potential liability above the insured amount of JPY 120 billion alone.
TEPCO estimated its total liability at JPY 2.5 trillion,63 a figure that has
since been revised up to more than JPY 3.8 trillion. 64 Against this, the
company’s net assets are worth no more than JPY 1.14 trillion. 65
Accordingly, TEPCO requested government assistance pursuant to the
Nuclear Compensation Law in May 2011.66
The government’s response was the creation of the Nuclear Damage
Liability Facilitation Fund. 67 The Fund is organized as a statutory
corporation, with half of its units held by the government and the remaining
half held by Japan’s twelve nuclear power operators, which are required to
make annual contributions. 68 In return, the Fund can render financial
assistance to any operator liable for compensation under the Nuclear
Damages Act, including through the acquisition of an equity interest in the
operator. 69 Where the potential liability of the operator far exceeds the
assets held by the Fund (as is naturally the case with the TEPCO payout), the
Fund may request government assistance in the form of a special issue of
government bonds. 70 Operators receiving financial assistance must
formulate a “special business plan” together with the Fund, geared towards
62
Only two cases that reached judgment seem to have been reported. See Tōkyō Chihō Saibansho
[Tokyo Dist. Ct.] June 29, 2011, Hei 23 (yo) no. 1099); Tōkyō Chihō Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] July 19
2012, Hei 23 (wa) no. 19191 (Japan).
63
TEPCO, ANNUAL REPORT 2012 1, 3 (2012), http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/corpinfo/ir/tool/annual/pdf/
ar2012-e.pdf.
64
TEPCO, ANNUAL REPORT 2013 at 39 (2013), http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/corpinfo/ir/tool/annual/
pdf/ar2013-e.pdf.
65
Id. at 21.
66
NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ACCIDENT ECON. DAMAGE RESPONSE TEAM, TŌKYŌ DENRYOKU

FUKUSHIMA GENSHIRYOKU HATSUDENSHO JIKO NI KAKAWARU GENSHIRYOKU SONGAI NO BAISHŌ NI KAN
SURU SEIFU NO SHIEN NO WAKUGUMI NI TSUITE [ON THE FRAMEWORK FOR GOVERNMENT SUPPORT IN
RELATION TO NUCLEAR DAMAGE COMPENSATION FOR THE ACCIDENT AT THE TEPCO FUKUSHIMA
NUCLEAR
POWER
PLANT]
(2013),
http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/pdf

/songaibaisho_110513_01.pdf.
67
Genshiryoku songai baishō enkatsu-ka kikin-hō [Nuclear Damages Liability Facilitation Fund
Law], Law No. 94 of 2011 (Japan).
68
Id. at art. 38.
69
Id. at art. 41.
70
Id. at art. 48.
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swift payment of compensation to victims and repayment of the further
assistance from the Fund through increased contributions.71 The relevant
minister must approve of the business plan and can order the operator to
produce reports and take appropriate measures for its duration.72
The reason for the abstract wording of the law (referring to “operators”
rather than TEPCO) and the reason that all nuclear power companies must
contribute to the fund—notwithstanding that only TEPCO bears any liability
from the Fukushima disaster—is that the Fund is intended to be a permanent
body.73 In this sense the Fund is best regarded as an additional layer of
insurance rather than a convoluted financing arrangement for TEPCO
alone.74
At the same time, the law establishing the Fund states that the
government is to put in place full measures to ensure that the Fund can fulfill
its objectives, in light of the government’s “social responsibility” in having
promoted the use of nuclear power in Japan.75 This wording almost appears
designed to eschew any question of legal responsibility.
TEPCO submitted its business plan and request for financial
assistance from the Fund in October 2011 and received approval in
November 2011.76 The company has made nineteen requests for assistance
to date77 and has issued new shares to the Fund such that the Fund now holds
54.69% of the shares in TEPCO.78 TEPCO has, therefore, in effect been
nationalized under the pretense of financial assistance.
CONTRAST: ASBESTOS COMPENSATION IN NEW SOUTH WALES

III.

TEPCO has reached a settled agreement in just over 600,000 of the
673,000 of the claims brought by victims of the Fukushima disaster to
71

Id. at art. 45.
Id. at art. 47.
73
Aribayashi, supra note 12, at 38.
74
Although Morita argues that it is better understood as a loss-sharing scheme. See Morita, supra
note 15, at 8.
75
Genshiryoku songai baishō enkatsu-ka kikin-hō [Nuclear Damages Liability Facilitation Fund
Law], Law No. 94 of 2011, art. 2 (Japan). This wording comes from a cabinet resolution–Tōkyōdenryoku
Fukushima genshiryokuhatsudenshojiko ni kansuru genshiryoku songai baishō ni kanren suru seifu no
shien taisei ni tsuite [Regarding the Government Support Structure in relation to Nuclear Damages in
respect of the Accident at the Tokyo Electric Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant].
76
Press Release, TEPCO, Approval of the Special Business Plan (Nov. 4, 2011),
http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/11110403-e.html.
77
Press Release, TEPCO, Financial Support from the Nuclear Damage Liability Facilitation Fund
(Aug. 21, 2013), http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/2013/1229905_5130.html.
78
See Corporate Information, TEPCO, http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/corpinfo/ir/stock/stock-e.html (last
visited Apr. 26, 2013). The Tokyo Metropolitan Government holds a further 1.2% of shares in TEPCO.
Id.
72
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date.79 If TEPCO is unable to settle in even a small proportion of those
outstanding claims, prompting claimants to instead turn to civil litigation for
redress, the burden on the court system could be tremendous. Consequently,
there are incentives for the creation of an alternative dispute resolution
model to alleviate this burden.
Government-sponsored mediation is a common form of ADR in
Japan. 80 However, other models of ADR are also available. One such
example is the NSW Dust Diseases Tribunal (“DDT”), which hears claims
in respect of diseases caused by environmental exposure to asbestos and
other silicates.81
The number of such claims against a small number of Australian
asbestos manufacturers has gradually risen in Australia since the use and
manufacture of asbestos products was steadily phased out in the 1980s.82
Indeed, as a proportion of population, the number of claims now heard by
the DDT on an annual basis is comparable with those dealt with by the
Japanese Dispute Resolution Center for Nuclear Damage Compensation. As
of August 2013, the Dispute Resolution Center had received a total of 7,545
claims since its establishment in 2011, of which 3,896 had been settled.83 In
2012 alone, the DDT, covering a jurisdiction with a population only five
percent that of Japan, received 451 claims and finalized 357.84
A.

Asbestos Exposure Rates in NSW are Among the Highest in the World

Governments in Australia as elsewhere were aware of the health
hazards associated with asbestos by the middle of the 20th century.85 Yet in
NSW asbestos was mined until 1979,86 while products containing amphibole
79
Records of Applications and Payouts for Indemnification of Nuclear Damage, TEPCO,
http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/comp/images/jisseki-e.pdf .
80
See Foote, supra note 13, at 1-4; see generally UPHAM, supra note 54.
81
See DUST DISEASES TRIBUNAL, http://www.dustdiseasestribunal.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/ (last visited
Aug. 29, 2013).
82
The first successful common law damages claims for asbestos-related diseases were made in the
late 1980s. See Pilmer v McPhersons Ltd. (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, Gobbo J, Sept. 1985)
(Austl.); Barrow & Heys v CSR Ltd. (Unreported, Supreme Court of Western Australia, Rowland J, Aug. 4,
1988) (Austl.).
83
See MINISTRY OF EDUC., CULTURE, SPORTS, SCI. AND TECH. – JAPAN,
http://www.mext.go.jp/a_menu/genshi_baisho/jiko_baisho/detail/1329118.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2013).
84
E-mail from Stephanie Chia, Registry Manager, Dust Diseases Tribunal, to author (Jan. 31, 2013)
(on file with author).
85
The Division of Industrial Hygiene within the NSW Department of Health, for example, reported
on the risks of asbestos exposure in 1927, 1938, and 1948. See Amaca Pty Ltd. (formerly known as James
Hardie & Coy Pty Ltd.) v New South Wales & Anor [2004] NSWCA 124, 83 (Austl.).
86
The state’s sole asbestos mine in Baryulgil, northern NSW, which was operated by the James
Hardie Group, was closed in April 1979. See HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES STANDING COMM. ON
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asbestos were manufactured until the late 1980s.87 Sales of asbestos were
not outlawed altogether until 2004.88 This represents a gap of some several
decades during which Australian governments could have regulated to
prohibit or restrict the use of asbestos, potentially saving lives.
Mass tort cases for asbestos exposure-related disease are certainly not
unique to Australia. However, Australia was historically the highest user per
capita of asbestos products, and rates of mesothelioma and other asbestosrelated diseases are higher in Australia than in any other country—most of
these within the state of NSW.89 It is estimated, for example, that there will
be a total of 18,000 cases of mesothelioma in NSW by 2020.90
Workers’ compensation claims for inhalation have been handled for
several decades outside of the NSW courts by the Dust Diseases Board, a
statutory no-fault compensation body for occupational diseases caused by all
forms of silicates.91 However, an increasing number of negligence claims
relate to long-term environmental exposure, such as through asbestos-lined
concrete used in commercial and residential buildings, and therefore fall
outside of the Dust Diseases Board’s jurisdiction.92
B.

The Dust Diseases Tribunal is an Independent Specialist Court

In 1989 the NSW government recognized the need to create a more
streamlined process for handling such claims, as many claimants were dying
from disease before judgment could be reached in the state Supreme Court.93
In response, the government created a specialist court in the form of the
DDT,94 which began hearing its first cases within the year.95
Although nominally a tribunal, the DDT is a court of record, meaning
that its proceedings are open to the public, governed by the NSW Uniform
Civil Procedure Rules, and that its judgments form part of the common

ABORIGINAL AFFAIRS, REPORT ON THE EFFECTS OF ASBESTOS MINING ON THE BARYULGIL COMMUNITY
(1984).
87
CANCER INST. OF NSW, MESOTHELIOMA IN NEW SOUTH WALES 1, 14 (2010), available at
http://www.cancerinstitute.org.au/media/27422/2010-9-22_monograph_mesothelioma_in_nsw.pdf.
88
Id. Specifically, the sale of all remaining products using chrysotile asbestos was prohibited.
89
O’Meally, supra note 20, at 1209-10.
90
Id. at 1210.
91
Workers Compensation (Dust Diseases) Act 1942 (NSW) 14 (Austl.).
92
See Lee C. Moerman & Sandra van der Laan, James Hardie & the Final Funding Agreement
(2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the University of Sydney).
93
O'Meally, supra note 20, at 1211-12.
94
See Dust Diseases Tribunal Act 1989 (NSW) 63 (Austl.).
95
O'Meally, supra note 20, at 1212.
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law.96 All cases must be heard before a qualified District or Supreme Court
judge, who has the same powers of contempt as in the Supreme Court.97
Accordingly, and unlike the Dispute Resolution Center, the DDT enjoys the
same degree of independence as the ordinary courts.
However, due to the need to process claims quickly, the DDT has
been provided with a procedural flexibility that is unique within the NSW
judiciary. For example, the DDT can sit at any hour on any day, anywhere
in or outside of Australia, and often does so at the bedsides of terminally ill
patients.98 The DDT’s record for hearing a claim is only four hours between
filing and judgment,99 although the average is naturally longer. Some rules
ordinarily applicable to tort claims, such as the general law limitation period,
are also not applicable to those before the DDT.100
The DDT has played an important role in keeping claims out of the
ordinary courts. However, its structure is very different from the Dispute
Resolution Center.
It is difficult to see any legal or constitutional barriers in Japan to
establishing a specialized, informal court capable of dealing with claims
quickly, like the DDT. The need to establish a body within a short
timeframe is no answer, as the DDT was set up in essentially the same
period of time as the Dispute Resolution Center. Nor is the fact that the
need for alternative dispute resolution is temporary. Since asbestos
production was effectively stopped several decades ago in Australia, the
DDT is also, by definition, a temporary dispute resolution body. Given that
TEPCO has received more than half of a million claims so far, it is fair to
assume that it will take many years to finalize all disputes. The desire to
limit the independence of the mediator, and to maximize influence over
TEPCO, may be one reason for the delay.
It is worth noting that Japan’s own response to increasing asbestos
litigation has again been to co-opt the claims process.101 Whereas in Japan,
too, laborers in asbestos-intensive industries have been eligible for workers’
compensation payments for some time. In 2006, the Diet passed the Law on
96
Dust Diseases Tribunal Act 1989, supra note 94, at pt. 2, ss. 4; Uniform Civil Procedure Rules
2005 (NSW), sch 1 (Austl.).
97
Dust Diseases Tribunal Act 1989 , supra note 94, at ss 7, 10 (Austl.).
98
O'Meally, supra note 20, at 1215.
99
Id.
100
The Limitations Act 1969 (NSW), which sets a general limitation period of six years in respect of
actions in tort, does not apply to proceedings that are brought before the DDT. See supra note 94, at s 12A.
101
In respect of asbestos litigation in Japan generally, see Eri Osaka, Asbestos Regulations and
Litigations in Japan: Recent Development and the Prospects for the Future (2011) (unpublished
manuscript); Luke Nottage, The ABCs of Product Safety Re-regulation in Japan: Asbestos, Buildings,
Consumer Electrical Goods, and Schindler's Lifts, 15 GRIFFITH L. REV. 242 (2006).

JANUARY 2014

GOVERNMENT LIABILITY FOR REGULATORY FAILURE

129

Relief for Health Damages from Asbestos, applicable to sufferers of
asbestos-related diseases caused by environmental exposure.102 Under this
law the Environmental Restoration and Conservation Agency administers a
no-fault compensation scheme, funded in part by industry, from which
standardized payments are made to any certified sufferer of an asbestosrelated disease or their families.103 It is again arguable that the government
is in part seeking to avoid potential claims where would-be defendants (such
as manufacturers of asbestos products) have become insolvent or cannot be
identified. In the same year that this law was passed, a well-publicized class
action suit was brought against the national government for failing to control
working conditions in, and emissions from, an asbestos factory in Sennan,
Osaka Prefecture.104
C.

Defendant Funding Arrangements have been at Arm’s Length

In a significant proportion of cases brought before the DDT,
companies in the James Hardie group, which held a near monopoly on the
manufacture of asbestos products in Australia for most of the twentieth
century, were among a very small number of defendants.105 Like TEPCO,
therefore, James Hardie as defendant stood as the principal shield against a
large volume of claims directly against the government.
As the number of claims mounted over the 1980s and 1990s, James
Hardie sought to distance its profit-making activities from its tort liabilities.
In 2001 the group established a trust in NSW to administer asbestos
compensation claims, while at the same time shifting the James Hardie
holding company and most of the group’s assets offshore, with the consent
of the state Supreme Court.106 In 2004 a critical judicial enquiry into James
Hardie’s corporate reorganization found the trust to be significantly
underfunded, in breach of its representations to the Supreme Court.107 James
Hardie negotiated with the NSW government, trade unions, and victims’
groups, finally agreeing to establish a new trust—the Asbestos Injuries
102
Ishiwata ni yoru kenkō higai no kyūsai ni kan suru hōritsu [Operation of the Asbestos Health
Hazard Relief Benefits, Environmental Restoration and Conservation Agency of Japan], Law No. 4 of 2006
(Japan).
103
ENV’T RESTORATION & CONSERVATION AGENCY OF JAPAN, OPERATION OF THE ASBESTOS
HEALTH HAZARD RELIEF BENEFITS, http://www.erca.go.jp/asbestos/relief/ (last visited Aug. 29, 2013).
104
The Osaka District Court found against the government and awarded plaintiffs JPY 435 million,
although this was reversed by the Osaka High Court on appeal. See Osaka Kōtō Saibansho [Osaka High
Ct.] Aug. 25, 2011, Hei 23 (ne) no. 2031 (Japan).
105
Moerman & van der Laan, supra note 92.
106
See generally Dunn, supra note 21.
107
Id.
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Compensation Fund (“AICF”)—paid for by 35% of James Hardie’s annual
cash flow.108 Under the agreement, the NSW government has the right to
appoint only a minority of directors to the board of the trustee.109
Following the global financial crisis and the consequent slump in
James Hardie’s building product sales, the government put in place a
standby loan facility for the AICF worth AUD 320 million, in exchange for
which the government received security over certain of the AICF’s assets.110
The loan facility agreement gives the government no control over the
operations of either the AICF or James Hardie.111
It is true that in one sense the NSW government could not have hoped
to impose stricter conditions on the AICF’s funding, given that most of
James Hardie’s assets were already offshore. However, given that it took
the NSW government several decades to concern itself with James Hardie’s
funding arrangements, and that it made no move to prevent the group’s
move offshore, it is arguable that the government would not have attempted
to intervene any further even if it had been possible to do so.
It is again difficult to see why the Japanese government could not
have similarly entered into an arm’s length financing arrangement of this
nature with TEPCO. Given that TEPCO has a statutory monopoly over the
provision of electricity around the capital, 112 the likelihood of default is
certainly far less than that of James Hardie, the fortunes of which are tied to
the global building industry, and which has anyway moved most of its assets
outside of Australia. The TEPCO funding arrangements seem instead to be
designed to maximize the government’s influence over TEPCO and other
plant operators, both by allowing the government to mandate operator
contributions and by using the provision of finance to give the government
considerable leverage over TEPCO’s operations.
IV.

GOVERNMENT LIABILITY FOR REGULATORY FAILURE IN JAPAN

The Japanese government’s concern to maintain control over the
dispute resolution process, and over TEPCO, through its funding
108
ASBESTOS INJURIES COMP. FUND, AMENDED AND RESTATED FINAL FUNDING AGREEMENT,
http://www.aicf.org.au/key_docs.php (last visited Aug. 29, 2013).
109
Id. at 50-51 (clauses 5.1 and 5.2 outline the composition of the Trustee Board and the power to
appoint directors respectively).
110
Parliament of New South Wales, AICF Facility Agreement (Dec. 9, 2010),
http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/la/latabdoc.nsf/0/15e23dae847b31bdca2578010021ac7c/$FILE/(a)
%20AICF%20facility%20agreement.pdf; see also James Hardie Former Subsidiaries (Winding Up and
Administration) Act 2005 (NSW) 105 (Austl.).
111
Parliament of New South Wales, supra note 110.
112
Denki jigyō hō [The Electricity Utilities Industry Law], Law No. 170 of 1964 (Japan).
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arrangements, can perhaps be explained by the potential for the government
to bear direct liability for the disaster.
A.

The State Compensation Act is the Basis for Government Liability in
Regulatory Failure Cases

While the Japanese government cannot bear any direct liability for
compensation of victims of the Fukushima disaster under the Nuclear
Compensation Law, it may nevertheless be possible for victims to bring
claims against the government on the basis of the State Compensation Law,
which makes special provisions for the tort liability of public authorities.113
The operator-centered liability principle of the Nuclear Compensation Law
arguably cannot preclude claims under the State Compensation Law (cf. the
Civil Code), as this would potentially be unconstitutional.114 The question is
therefore on what grounds a claim under the State Compensation Law is
possible.
Article 1(1) of the State Compensation Law provides that: “[w]here
an officer exercising the public functions of the State or of a public authority
has, in the course of their duties, unlawfully inflicted damage upon another
person whether intentionally or negligently, the State or public authority
shall be liable for compensation.”115
As under the general tort provision of the Civil Code,116 there is no
separate cause of action for negligence. All “unlawful” conduct occasioning
damage—whether negligent or intentional—falls under the heading of
“tortious conduct” (fuhō kōi). 117 “Unlawfulness” (ihōsei) equates broadly
with the infringement of rights and legally protected interests.118 Whereas in
cases under the Civil Code damage itself is usually determinative of

113
Kokka baishō-hō/kokka wa hōritsu o zesei [State Compensation Law/State Redress Law], Law
No. 125 of 1947 (Japan).
114
It would be inconsistent with Article 17 of the Constitution, which provides citizens a right to sue
for illegal acts by public officials. See Tadashi Ōotsuka, Fukushima dai-ichi genpatsu jiko ni yoru songai
baishō to baishō shien kikō hō: fuhō kōi hōgaku no kanten kara [Damages Compensation for the
Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident and the Compensation Facilitation Fund Law: From a
Torts Law Perspective], JURISUTO, at 40 (2011).
115
Kokka baishō-hō/kokka wa hōritsu o zesei [State Compensation Law/State Redress Law], Law
No. 125 of 1947 (Japan). This is the author’s personal translation of the State Compensation Law/State
Redress Law. An alternative translation of the law in full is available online on the Japanese Law
Translation website, http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp, where the law is referred to as the “State
Redress Law.”
116
MINPŌ [MINPŌ ] [CIV. C.] art. 709 (Japan).
117
Id.
118
RYŌICHI YOSHIMURA, FUHŌ KŌI [TORT LAW] 39-42 (Yūhikaku ed., 4th ed. 2009).
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unlawfulness,119 under the State Compensation Law the infliction of damage
must be unlawful within the context of the public (i.e., regulatory) function
contemplated. 120 As many functions are premised upon the deliberate
infringement of rights and interests for the public benefit, something more is
required. Unlawfulness is therefore determined in light of the underlying
statute in accordance with which the relevant function was exercised, as well
as any applicable procedural or organizational rules.121 The exercise of the
function need not necessarily be invalid for administrative law purposes,
although a prior judgment of invalidity will be persuasive.122
B.

Japanese Courts have Increasingly Recognized Liability in Regulatory
Failure Cases

Several omissions on the part of government agencies have been
pointed to as possible grounds for liability with respect to the Fukushima
disaster. The Nuclear Safety Commission (“NSC”) failed, for example, to
keep its Inspection Guidelines for Seismic Design for Nuclear Power
Facilities up-to-date with new knowledge on the scale of past seismic
activity in the Tohoku region. 123 According to the Diet’s Independent
Commission Report, the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (“NISA”)
accepted at face value calculations by the Japan Society of Civil Engineers
as to the maximum height of any possible tsunami, and TEPCO’s own
calculations as to the probability of a tsunami reaching the Fukushima Daiichi plant, without conducting independent analysis. 124 While inspection
guidelines are not binding on operators, the NSC also failed to exercise its
rule-making functions to mandate severe accident countermeasures for
natural disasters in line with international trends.125 The NSC, moreover,
failed to make any provision under its disaster prevention guidelines for
multiple disasters (such as a station blackout following an earthquake or

119

Indeed, Article 709 does not use the term “unlawful,” although it is widely used in tort law
jurisprudence.
120
HIDETAKE SATŌ, JITSUMU HANREI: CHIKUJŌ KOKKA BAISHŌ HŌ [PRACTICAL CASE LAW:
ANNOTATED STATE COMPENSATION LAW] 53 (Sankyō Hōki, 2008).
121
Id. at 57.
122
Id. at 60.
123
Hitomi, supra note 36, at 23. See Noboru Utatsu, Genshiryoku songai baishō hō ni okeru sekinin
shūchū gensoku to kokka hoshō [The Concentrated Liability Principle Under the Nuclear Damage
Compensation Law and State Compensation], 74 SONGAI HOKEN KENKYŪ (2012) for a detailed analysis of
faults in other NSC guidelines (on file with author).
124
FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR ACCIDENT INDEP. INVESTIGATION COMM’N, supra note 1, at 27.
125
INDEP. INVESTIGATION COMM'N ON THE FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR ACCIDENT, supra note 5, at 279.
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tsunami that disrupts access to the site), regarding the probability of multiple
disasters occurring as “extremely low.”126
Even on the basis of the existing inspection guidelines, regulators’
oversight appears to have been lax. After revising the Seismic Design
Guidelines in 2006, NISA and METI chose the softer option of requiring
operators with existing facilities to conduct “backchecks” (safety
assessments) rather than ordering “backfits” (upgrading of facilities in
accordance with specified technical standards). 127 Given the age of the
Numbers one through four reactors at Fukushima Dai-ichi, both TEPCO and
NISA were aware that existing safety facilities could not meet the 2006
standards.128 Nevertheless, after submitting only partial interim reports in
2008 and 2009, TEPCO repeatedly delayed submitting its final backcheck
report.129 NISA neither required TEPCO to produce its final report earlier
nor ordered it to carry out reinforcement of the Numbers one through four
reactors.130
The State Compensation Law does not explicitly refer to omissions,
and the Japanese courts were traditionally reluctant to recognize the
unlawfulness of a failure to exercise a regulatory function—as opposed to
the negligent or improper use of a function—due to concern about
interfering with administrative discretion. As a general principle of tort law,
liability for an omission can only arise where there was a positive duty to act.
In the context of the State Compensation Law, courts have more readily
recognized such a positive duty on the part of a public authority to exercise
non-discretionary regulatory functions 131 but have been hesitant to do so
when the function is discretionary, 132 such as the NSC’s rule-making
functions.
Since the 1970s, however, lower courts have increasingly ruled
against the government in cases of regulatory failure for discretionary
functions also.133 For example, from the 1970s to the 1980s, several district
courts found that the Ministry of Health’s failure to withdraw marketing
126
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128
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approvals for stomach medication linked with SMON disorder was
unlawful.134
The Supreme Court has considered liability for regulatory failure in
four principal cases and found against the government in two of them. Each
case involved regulatory functions with some degree of discretion: two with
respect to ordinary licensing functions, 135 and two with respect to rulemaking functions over matters of health and safety.136 Although none of
these tests have evinced a clear criterion for unlawfulness, each has
employed something close to the main test for invalidity of discretionary
functions under ordinary administrative law, 137 considering whether the
relevant regulatory failure “significantly lacked reasonableness” in light of
the purpose of the function granted or the nature of the function.138 If so, the
failure to regulate will exceed the bounds of the discretion, effectively
giving rise to a positive duty to exercise the function.
In comparison with the wealth of lower court regulatory failure cases
relating to, for example, consumer products,139 there is no past precedent
with respect to nuclear damage, including among the Tōkaimura litigation,
which was directed solely at the nuclear operator. In 2011 a group of
TEPCO shareholders sought to recover their losses from the fall in TEPCO’s
share price against the government, arguing that the government and not
TEPCO was responsible for the Fukushima disaster by promoting nuclear
134

Id. at 202.
See Real Estate Law Case, Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Nov. 24, 1989, no. 43(10), SAIKŌ
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1169, 1337 HANREI JIHŌ [HANJI] 48 (Japan); Chloroquine Medical
Harm Case, Supreme Court Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 23, 1995, 49(6) SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI
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power without setting down sufficient disaster standards, and that it failed to
adequately consider whether the exception to liability under the Nuclear
Compensation Law could apply.140 However, this case appears to have been
filed before the publication of the Independent Commission Report, and in a
terse judgment, the Tokyo District Court found simply that the basis upon
which government liability was claimed was unclear and could not be
upheld.141 Whether, in the light of the various reports’ findings, any of the
above omissions could be said to “significantly lack reasonableness” is
therefore an open question. The two cases in which the Supreme Court has
previously found liability on the part of the government may offer some
guidance.
C.

Case Studies: The Chikuhō Pneumoconiosis Case and the Kansai
Minamata Disease Case

This part examines two cases where the Supreme Court found an
omission to exercise a regulatory function unlawful:
the Chikuhō
Pneumoconiosis Case and the Kansai Minamata Disease Case.
1.

The Chikuhō Pneumoconiosis Case

The first case in which the Supreme Court found an omission to
exercise a regulatory function unlawful was the Chikuhō Pneumoconiosis
Case. 142 There, former miners at major (but now defunct) coal mines in
Chikuhō, Fukuoka Prefecture, brought suits against the national government
for failing to exercise regulatory functions under the Mine Safety Law143 so
as to prevent them from developing coal workers’ pneumoconiosis
(colloquially known as “black lung”), a type of respiratory disease similar to
asbestosis. 144 Specifically, they argued that the relevant minister had
sufficient knowledge of the risks of exposure to coal dust at the time that the
preventative Pneumoconiosis Law145 came into force in 1960. However, the
minister failed to exercise his powers under the Mine Safety Law to amend
existing ministerial ordinances to mandate suitable abatement techniques or
to exercise adequate safety supervision of mines.146 Abatement techniques
140

Tōkyō Chihō Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] Apr. 25, 2012, Hei 23 (wa) no. 13288 (Japan).
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Jinpai-hō [Pneumoconiosis Law], Law No. 30 of 1960 (Japan).
146
Chikuhō Pneumoconiosis Case, supra note 142, at 126.
141

136

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. 23 NO. 1

such as the use of water flushing rock drills had been mandatory in Japanese
gold mines since 1952 but were resisted in coal mining, it was argued,
because of the importance of cheap coal for the country’s economic
policy.147
The Supreme Court found that such a failure was contrary to the
purpose of the Mine Safety Law—to safeguard the health and safety of
miners—and therefore “significantly lacked reasonableness,” rendering it
unlawful.148 Although not explicitly applying the discretion reduction theory,
the Supreme Court found relevant as part of the “general considerations”
surrounding the failure to regulate that the risk to health was foreseeable and
could have been avoided by exercise of the function.149
2.

The Kansai Minamata Disease Case

In the Kansai Minamata Disease Case, decided only a few months
after the Chikuhō case, the Supreme Court again found a minister liable for
failing to intervene earlier to minimize the effects of Minamata disease in
Minamata Bay, Kumamoto Prefecture.150 By the late 1950s it was widely
suspected that poisonous mercury compounds released from a local plant of
Chisso, a chemical manufacturer, and ingested via fish caught in the bay,
were responsible for the outbreak of the disease. 151 However, the
government delayed taking action for more than a decade before finally
regulating emissions into Minamata Bay.152 In this case, the Supreme Court
found that even if the Minister did not have actual knowledge of the source
of the poisonous mercury compounds in the 1950s, the source could have
been discovered if a more thorough investigation had been made, and the
number of disease sufferers minimized if the appropriate functions under
relevant water safety laws had been exercised to prohibit further releases of
mercury.153
The Court found that the failures both to carry out this investigation
and consequently to take appropriate regulatory measures from the point at
which the hypothetical investigation could have occurred again
147
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150
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“significantly lacked reasonableness” and were unlawful.154 So too was the
failure of the Kumamoto prefectural government to take equivalent action
under the prefectural Fisheries Ordinance, 155 notwithstanding that the
prefecture had fewer resources than the national government and that the
relevant ordinance was not directly related to industrial pollution.156 Again,
the court stressed foreseeability and avoidability as part of the “general
considerations” leading to unlawfulness.157
3.

Analyzing the Chikuhō Pneumoconiosis Case and the Kansai
Minamata Disease Case

The Chikuhō and Minamata Disease cases appear to suggest that
failure to exercise discretionary regulatory functions will “significantly lack
reasonableness” where 1) there is a risk of significant harm, 2) the
government is aware or should be aware of the risk of harm, and 3) it is
within the government’s power to prevent harm by exercising its regulatory
function.
To some extent, all three conditions are met by the facts of the
Fukushima disaster. As noted above, the independent commissions’ reports
found that the NSC and NISA could have kept themselves informed of the
potential for a tsunami the size of that which struck the Fukushima plant if
they had sought independent advice. At the very least, NISA was aware that
the Fukushima plant did not meet the NSC’s existing (out-of-date) standards.
It was certainly within the power of the NSC to issue more stringent
standards or of NISA to enforce backfits of the Fukushima plant, although
there are genuine causal questions as to whether either alone could have
prevented the disaster.
Other factors may also point to potential liability. One common
observation is that courts are more likely to find that a failure to regulate was
significantly unreasonable and hence unlawful where the interest affected
was personal safety or health rather than property. 158 Thus the Supreme
Court found against the government in the Chikuhō and Minamata Disease
cases, but not in the Real Estate Law case, where a defrauded property buyer
sought to claim against a local government for failing to prevent his loss by
154
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withdrawing the registration of the defrauding realtor. 159 While any
litigation arising from the Fukushima disaster would presumably relate
mainly to property damage, the potential, if not actual, harm from radiation
that could have occurred may push the government’s inadequate oversight of
TEPCO into the same category.
It can also be observed that in both the Chikuhō and Minamata
Disease cases, the government had actively sided with the primary
tortfeasors—coal mining companies in the Chikuhō case, and Chisso in the
Minamata Disease case—to avoid imposing an economic burden on them.
This no doubt also informed the court’s finding as to the reasonableness of
the decision not to regulate. As noted above, in the case of TEPCO, too, the
independent investigation commissions were critical of government
regulators for falling captive to industry and for failing to exercise
independence in setting or enforcing seismic safety standards.
On the other hand, one significant issue raised by the Fukushima
accident, which to date has not been resolved by the Supreme Court, is the
relationship between the scope of intended beneficiaries of a given public
function and the existence of a positive duty to exercise it. While some
functions relate to only a narrow class of parties, the scope of others—
particularly broad rule-making functions, such as those exercised by NISA
and the NSC—are quite wide.
Some lower courts have sought to resolve this question by borrowing
from administrative law the “reflexive interest principle” (hanshateki rieki
ron) of standing. Under this modified principle, the failure to exercise a
function will not be unlawful unless plaintiffs can demonstrate a legal right
that an authority is bound to protect in light of the objectives for which the
function is granted, and not simply a “reflexive” interest as an ordinary
member of the public.160 Where the scope of potential beneficiaries is broad,
it is less likely that an individualized right will be made out.
The Supreme Court has not made its position clear. Although not
explicitly referred to, the reflexive interest principle appears to have been
relevant to the decision in the Real Estate Law case.161 The Supreme Court
held that the purpose of registration of realtors under the Real Estate Law
was not to protect every individual party to a real estate transaction from loss,
and therefore the failure to protect could not be unlawful.162
159
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However, the use of the reflexive interest in State Compensation Law
cases has been widely criticized,163 and the principle does not appear to have
been referred to at all in either the Chikuhō or Minamata Disease cases. In
any event, in the Monju Reactor Case, an administrative law case in which
local residents sought to void the construction permission for the Monju
reactor in Fukui Prefecture, the reflexive interest principle was considered
and found not to act as a bar to bringing suit.164
GOVERNMENT LIABILITY FOR REGULATORY FAILURE: A COMMON LAW
COMPARISON

V.

Compared to the response of the Japanese government to the
Fukushima disaster, the less interventionist response of the NSW
government to mounting asbestos claims may relate to the potential for the
government to be held directly liable for failure to adequately regulate the
use and sale of asbestos products. In contrast with the Japanese position
described above, courts in Australia, as in other common law countries, have
been reluctant to impose liability for the exercise or non-exercise of
discretionary regulatory functions (as opposed to private law functions).
Again, this is not to suggest that common law governments never take a
stronger hand in responding to mass tort situations. However, their own
potential liability need not act as a determining factor.
A.

The Common Law Position Makes it Difficult to Establish a Duty of
Care

Unlike Japan, most common law jurisdictions do not have a separate
body of law governing state liability in negligence.165 Indeed, the starting
point at common law is total sovereign immunity from tort liability,
although this has been largely waived by statute in most jurisdictions.166 To
this extent, in theory the ordinary common law tort rules apply to public
authorities, consistent with the Diceyan view of the rule of law, where the
State stands on equal footing to ordinary members of the public before the
163
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courts.167 In practice, however, the courts have tended to apply a higher
threshold in determining the existence of a duty of care towards members of
the public. The different approaches of courts in the United States, England
and Australia vary to some degree and are considered in turn below.
1.

The Anglo-American Approach: “Planning” vs. “Operational”
Decisions

Courts in both the United States and England have focused on the
character of the regulatory function in question when determining the
existence of a duty of care. In the United States, state liability for torts is
primarily governed by statute, particularly the Federal Tort Claims Act
(“FTCA”), which provides a right of action for any negligent or wrongful act
or omission by an employee of the federal government where a private
person would be liable for the same conduct.168 This broad right is qualified
by several exceptions including, most importantly, the “discretionary
function exception,” which excludes liability for:
[a]ny claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of
the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a
statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation
be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the
failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty
on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the
Government, whether or not the discretion involved be
abused.169
The discretionary function exception thus can limit the government’s
liability in many instances.
In the early case of Dalehite v. United States,170 the Supreme Court
drew a distinction between functions at the “planning” level of
administrative activity, which tend to be highly discretionary in nature and
so are automatically immune, and functions at the “operational” level, which
are not.171 The Supreme Court later clarified that the administrative level at
which decisions are made will not alone be determinative of the operation of
the exception, focusing its attention on the discretionary character of the
167
168
169
170
171

See Weeks, supra note 18.
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function.172 The Court instead extended the exception to any functions that
involve the exercise of discretion and which are “susceptible to policy
analysis” (whether or not the ultimate decision was actually informed by
policy considerations), 173 potentially greatly expanding the range of
administrative decisions to which the exception applies. A 2002 study found
that government agencies had successfully relied upon the discretionary
function exception in 72% of its cases.174
The FTCA explicitly includes omissions within the scope of the
discretionary function exception. 175 Courts have held that the exception
applies where an omission results from a policy decision based on the need
to balance competing factors. For example, the exception has been applied
on several occasions to failures to adequately signpost hazards within
national parks.176 Although not a highly political function, decisions as to
whether or not to erect a signpost involve a balancing between safety on the
one hand, and the need to minimize disturbance to the natural environment
on the other, as well as to manage finite resources.
While state liability in England is a matter of common law, the
English courts have also adopted an approach close to the discretionary
function exception. In Anns v. Merton London Borough Council, where the
planning/operational distinction was imported from the American
jurisprudence, the court held that public authorities would be immune from
liability for the exercise of functions with respect to “policy” matters,
provided that the exercise was intra vires.177 In the case of X (Minors) v.
Bedfordshire County Council, the public law test of ultra vires was
abandoned as a condition, and it was held that any decision involving an
assessment of policy matters (such as social policy or the allocation of
limited financial resources) would be non-justiciable.178
More recently, however, courts have moved away somewhat from the
planning (or “policy”) or operational distinction, noting that the distinction is
not always helpful or reliable.179 Instead, courts have begun to emphasize
172
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the question of reasonableness for the purpose of breach of duty, rather than
the existence of a duty of care.180 Nevertheless, the distinction continues to
be influential.181
It seems likely that many of the omissions to exercise regulatory
functions with respect to TEPCO as identified by the independent
commissions could be characterized as “planning” or “policy” functions, or
“susceptible to policy analysis.” This is particularly so for highly
discretionary rule-making functions, such as the NSC’s powers to set safety
standards. Therefore, based on this strict distinction alone, equivalent
omissions in the United States or England would arguably be unlikely to
attract liability.
As noted above, however, courts in Japan have increasingly intruded
upon discretionary functions. It did not seem to matter to the Supreme Court
in either the Chikuhō or Minamata Disease cases that the functions
complained of included highly discretionary rule-making functions, and
moreover, were those exercised by a minister. Indeed, in other State
Compensation Law cases plaintiffs have even succeeded in holding the Diet
liable for failure to pass legislation beneficial to their interests.182
2.

The Australian Approach: “Special Control”

The High Court of Australia has also considered the
planning/operational distinction,183 but to date has not adopted it. The High
Court has, however, suggested that the exercise or otherwise of a function
will be for example, where it touches on “core policy” matters,184 or is of a
“quasi-legislative” (i.e., rule-making) character.185
Instead of the character of the function itself, Australian courts tend to
focus on the conduct of the relevant public authority surrounding the
exercise of the function. With respect to regulatory failure, it is settled that
the mere existence of a regulatory power will not give rise to a common law
duty of care to exercise that power in order to avert harm. 186 Nor is it
180
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sufficient that the public authority is aware in a general sense of the potential
risk of harm if it fails to exercise its power.187 Rather, a duty of care will
only arise where some positive act by the authority has created the risk of
harm or has specifically encouraged individuals to rely on the authority for
ensuring their safety.188 Recent cases have also emphasized that a duty of
care may arise where a public authority enjoys a “significant and special
measure of control” over an individual’s safety or the safety of his/her
property.189 “Control” does not exist simply because the authority has the
power to regulate certain conduct; rather, the authority must be directly
responsible for the source of the risk of harm.190
Moreover, the existence of an actionable duty to exercise a function
must be consistent with and anticipated by the relevant legislation granting
the power to exercise it. This will most commonly be the case where the
subject of the power is an identifiable individual or class of persons, rather
than the public at large.191
Two relatively recent cases in the context of asbestos litigation
demonstrate the degree of “special control” required to establish a duty of
care to exercise a regulatory function.
The first of these is Crimmins v Stevedoring Industry Finance
Committee.192 Between 1961 and 1965, Mr. Crimmins was a stevedore on
the docks of the Port of Melbourne.193 Under the system in place, stevedores
were registered with the Australian Stevedoring Industry Authority, a public
body that maintained a presence in the port and directed stevedores to work
for particular employers on a casual basis (often for only hours at a time),
loading and unloading ships. 194 While the Authority never directly
employed stevedores, it was nevertheless responsible for paying the
stevedores, including “attendance pay” where stevedores were assigned no
187
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work, and could exercise certain disciplinary powers over them.195 It could,
for example, suspend or deregister a stevedore who refused to comply with
work assignments. 196 The Authority could also direct employers with
respect to workplace safety.197 Although aware of the risk of exposure to
asbestos products loaded and unloaded by stevedores, the Authority did not
direct employers to provide the stevedores with protective respiratory
equipment, which contributed to the development of Mr. Crimmins’s
mesothelioma.198
A majority of the High Court found that the Authority had a duty of
care towards Mr. Crimmins and other stevedores.199 In a leading majority
judgment, Judge McHugh noted that a duty could not ordinarily arise where
a power was directed toward the benefit of the public at large,200 but that in
this case, the relevant powers related very specifically to the stevedores.201
The Authority’s disciplinary powers enabled it to compel Mr. Crimmins to
work in circumstances in which there was a risk of harm, placing him at a
“special vulnerability” to the Authority.202 Moreover, the Authority had a
greater incentive to ensure workplace safety than the employers, which had
usually employed Mr. Crimmins for only short periods of time.203
However, Crimmins should be best understood as a unique case
highlighting the exceptional degree of control by a public authority required
to establish a duty of care. The NSW case of Amaca v NSW also considered
the liability of a public authority for failure to mandate workplace safety
standards for handling asbestos, but was distinguished from Crimmins on the
basis of the degree of control enjoyed by the authority.204
The victim in Amaca, Mr. Hay, worked in the construction of a power
station in NSW in the 1950s and 1960s, where he handled asbestos products
without adequate respiratory equipment. 205 The government inspector
regularly visited the worksite and investigated workplace safety, among
other things, but made no specific directions regarding asbestos.206 After
developing mesothelioma, Mr. Hay brought an action against his employer
195
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and the owner of the power plant in the DDT. 207 Both defendants
successfully cross-claimed against James Hardie, the manufacturer of the
products used on the site, who in turn cross-claimed against the state of
NSW.208 James Hardie argued that the NSW government had been generally
aware of the dangers of asbestos, and was particularly aware of dangerous
levels of asbestos dust onsite at Mr. Hay’s workplace as a result of a key
inspection report.209 Therefore, it argued, the state should have mandated
the use of respiratory equipment. 210 The NSW Court of Appeal rejected
those arguments, noting that in contrast to the Australian Stevedoring
Industry Authority in Crimmins, the state through its inspectors exercised no
day-to-day control over Mr. Hay’s working conditions.211 Nor did it have
any greater knowledge of or incentive to eliminate the risk of harm than the
other parties.212 Consequently, no duty of care arose.213
The degree of control exercised by Japan’s nuclear regulators over
residents surrounding the Fukushima plant arguably falls well short of the
high watermark for control exercised by the stevedoring authority in
Crimmins. The NSC may have set general safety standards and NISA
conducted inspections, but TEPCO remained responsible for the day-to-day
operation of the Fukushima plant. Other than at the initial stage of approval
for the plant’s location, the government also had no control over residents
proximity to the plant. Indeed, NISA’s inspection powers are somewhat
analogous to those of the government inspector in Amaca. It therefore
seems unlikely that either the NSC or NISA would be regarded as exercising
“special control” over the victims of the disaster.
By contrast, as noted above, the Chikuhō and Minamata Disease
decisions appear to stand for the proposition that in Japan the mere
knowledge of potential harm (or constructive knowledge, in the case of the
Minamata Disease case) and the capacity to have exercised a regulatory
power to prevent that harm can be sufficient to render the failure to regulate
unreasonable.
Given that to date more than half of a million claims have been
received by TEPCO under its voluntary compensation program, there is also
a question as to whom a duty to exercise regulatory functions over TEPCO
may have been owed. The Australian courts have adopted a principle not
207
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unlike the Japanese reflexive interest principle, declining to impose a duty
where a regulatory power is for the benefit of the public at large. However,
the applicability of the reflexive interest principle in regulatory failure cases
in Japan is unclear, particularly where the relevant harm relates to personal
health and safety. The Supreme Court’s failure rely on the principle in the
Chikuhō and Minamata Disease cases suggests that the principle may not
apply. Indeed, whereas the subject of the minister’s power to regulate mine
safety in the Chikuhō case arguably related to an identifiable class of persons
to whom a duty could be owed (i.e., coal miners), the same could not be said
for the very general powers in the Minamata Disease case to regulate water
quality in public waterways.
VI.

JUDICIAL POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

The case law in Australia points to a number of reasons why courts
hesitate to recognize a duty of care in regulatory failure cases. Courts in
Australia, as in Japan and elsewhere, have been concerned to varying
degrees about the degree to which it is constitutionally appropriate for them
to judge the reasonableness of exercises of administrative discretion.
However, as alluded to by Chief Justice Gleeson, as part of the majority in
Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan, the position in Australia is that the
question of whether to regulate a field of activity or not in the first place, or
to leave industry to self-regulate in the shadow of private damages suits, is a
highly political one, and often not suitable for resolution by the judiciary.214
Relatedly, in cases where the impugned failure is a failure to regulate
so as to prevent a third party from causing harm, Australian courts have
found it particularly significant if the primary tortfeasor was not a public
authority but rather a commercial actor with a self-interest in minimizing
risk of harm.215 Requiring the government to take positive steps to prevent
another party’s negligence is both inconsistent with the general common
law’s reluctance to find a duty of care for omissions, and arguably reduces
the moral culpability of the primary tortfeasor. As Justice of Appeal Ipp
noted in the leading judgment in Amaca, such arguments, when made by a
primary tortfeasor, are “less than compelling from a social point of view.”216
Japanese courts, on the other hand, have tended to regard public authorities
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as less deserving of protection from liability than private defendants,
precisely because they are compelled to act in the public interest.217
Requiring public authorities to regulate to prevent third party
negligence also potentially puts the government in the position of being an
insurer of last resort whenever the primary tortfeasor cannot be identified or
is insufficiently capitalized to pay damages, simply because the government
has “deeper pockets.” Judgments in several Australian cases have pointed to
the “massive obligation” that could be borne by the state if it were liable for
every missed opportunity to prevent harm.218 It is telling that the Chikuhō
case was the first pneumoconiosis compensation case brought against the
Japanese government, and only after most of Japan’s coal mining companies
were closed.219
Another more practical reason for denying liability is the difficulty of
proving a counterfactual in order to demonstrate a causal relationship
between the regulatory failure and the damage suffered.220 Courts run the
risk of realizing too late which regulatory steps could have prevented harm,
which in the case of the Fukushima disaster became clear only after months
of detailed investigations. Moreover, determining the precise point at which
liability arose in the absence of a specific positive act can have arbitrary
results, as seen by the Chikuhō case, where the Supreme Court held that the
minister’s failure to regulate had only been unreasonable from the day of the
passage of the Pneumoconiosis Law on March 31, 1960, thereby rejecting
several claims predating the law.221
VII. CONCLUSION
In contrast with the Japanese government’s ostensibly inadequate
regulation of TEPCO and other nuclear operators prior to the meltdown at
the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant, its response in facilitating the
resolution and funding of claims related to the disaster demonstrates a
significant degree of government intervention. The government successfully
convinced TEPCO to begin compensating victims only weeks after the
disaster, thereby seriously impairing TEPCO’s ability to disclaim liability
under the Nuclear Damages Compensation Law. It then used its powers
217

SATŌ, supra note 120, at 69; see also Surma, supra note 17, at 398.
Amaca Pty Ltd. v NSW & ANOR, supra note 215, at 159; Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan,
supra note 214, at 324.
219
See Chikuhō Pneumoconiosis Case, Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 27, 2004, 58(4) SAIKŌ
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1032, 1152 HANREI TAIMUZU [HANTA] 120 (Japan).
220
Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd. v Ryan, (2002) 211 CLR 540, 10 (Austl.).
221
Chikuhō Pneumoconiosis Case, supra note 219, at 121.
218

148

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. 23 NO. 1

under the law to set the terms for compensation and to put in place an ad hoc
body under MEXT to mediate disputes in accordance with those terms. It
established a mandatory provider of financial assistance to TEPCO in the
form of the now-permanent Nuclear Damages Liability Facilitation Fund,
coercing all nuclear operators into participating in its funding. The
legislation establishing the Fund gives the government the power to direct
TEPCO’s business conduct, effectively nationalizing the company and
removing any possibility of independence.
Whether or not this level of intervention is desirable, it was arguably
not necessary to achieve the aims of smoothly administering large volumes
of claims against TEPCO and ensuring TEPCO’s solvency in order to pay
them. So much is clear from the response of the NSW government to mass
tort claims for asbestos exposure. The Japanese government could have
established a specialized court in the same manner as the NSW Dust
Diseases Tribunal, with the ability to quickly and flexibly resolve disputes
but with the independence and enforcement powers of an ordinary civil court.
Similarly, to ensure TEPCO’s solvency, the government could have entered
into a simple financing agreement with a priority charge over TEPCO’s
assets, as did the NSW government with James Hardie.
From a legal perspective, the sharply differing responses of the
Japanese government to claims arising from the Fukushima disaster and of
the NSW government to the high volume of asbestos exposure cases can in
part be explained by the desire of the Japanese government to minimize the
risk of its own liability for damages to those affected by the disaster. In
contrast with jurisprudence on state liability for regulatory failure in
common law countries, the approach taken in Japan means that there is a
good possibility that the government would be found liable.
The first reported claims against the government for its handling of
the Fukushima disaster have now begun to emerge,222 but the government
could face a deluge if TEPCO is allowed to fold or is too slow and
unresponsive to claims. Unlike TEPCO, which is limited in the amount it
can pay to victims by the value of its assets, the Japanese government could
be liable for an almost unlimited amount of damages. The earlier Tōkaimura
cases show that the potential scope of “nuclear damages” under the Nuclear
Compensation Law is to be interpreted broadly, and a similar approach
would no doubt be taken by courts, which are not bound by the Dispute
222
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Reconciliation Committee’s Institutional Guidelines, to any claims with
respect to the Fukushima disaster. Such large-scale litigation could also
institutionalize actions against the government as a legitimate response to
third party torts wherever the government was a more attractive defendant,
thereby opening the floodgates to the “massive obligations” that have
concerned the Australian courts. The incentives for the government to
intervene in and manage the claims resolution process are clear.

